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Abstract
Today, aggressive verbal behavior is generally perceived as a threat to integrity and democratic quality of public discussions,
including those online. However, we argue that, in more restrictive political regimes, communicative aggression may play
constructive roles in both discussion dynamics and empowerment of political groups. This might be especially true for
restrictive political and legal environments like Russia, where obscene speech is prohibited by law in registered media and
the political environment does not give much space for voicing discontent. Taking Russian YouTube as an example, we
explore the roles of two under-researched types of communicative aggression—obscene speech and politically motivated
hate speech—within the publics of video commenters. For that, we use the case of the Moscow protests of 2019 against
non-admission of independent and oppositional candidates to run for the Moscow city parliament. The sample of over
77,000 comments for 13 videos of more than 100,000 views has undergone pre-processing and vocabulary-based detec-
tion of aggression. To assess the impact of hate speech upon the dynamics of the discussions, we have used Granger tests
and assessment of discussion histograms; we have also assessed the selected groups of posts in an exploratory manner.
Our findings demonstrate that communicative aggression helps to express immediate support and solidarity. It also con-
textualizes the criticism towards both the authorities and regime challengers, as well as demarcates the counter-public.
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1. Introduction
In contemporary networked discussions, aggressive ver-
bal behavior is a widespread phenomenon. The ini-
tial optimism about the democratic potential of online
communicative milieus as new deliberative spaces
(Diakopoulos & Naaman, 2011) was replaced in the
2010s by a pessimistic perception of them as dominated
by trivia (Fuchs, 2017) as well as incivility, false infor-
mation, and hate speech, conceptualized as ‘dark par-
ticipation’ (Quandt, 2018). Aggressive speech has, for
years, been almost exclusively considered a negative phe-
nomenon worth detecting and filtering out, as aggres-
sion challenges the argumentative integrity of online
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discussions (Vollhardt, Coutin, Staub,Weiss, & Deflander,
2007) and their normatively understood democratic
quality (Cortese, 2006). In this capacity, it is simultane-
ously a digital threat of a non-political nature (Salter,
Kuehn, Berentson-Shaw, & Elliott, 2019) and a threat to
a rational and politically relevant public sphere (Miller &
Vaccari, 2020; Pfetsch, 2018).
So far, this view upon aggressive speech has been
challenged from several viewpoints. Thus, many works
have addressed the dilemma of ‘free speech vs. hate
speech’ (Hare & Weinstein, 2010; Howard, 2017;
Weinstein, 2017). This well-known debate, including how
hate speech and its being banned from public use relates
to equality, autonomy, and legitimacy, has been recon-
structedbyMassaro (1990) andWaldron (2012). As a rule,
bans on hate speech may be found in laws that prevent
group hate and promote inter-group tolerance (Waldron,
2012, p. 8). However, this line of debate does not, in
effect, challenge the understanding of aggressive speech
as a threat, and only a threat, to democratic discussion;
here, only the boundaries of what may be banned are
debated. Also, it does not address the issue of politically
motivated offensive language, as, in democracies, politi-
cal groups are not considered disadvantaged minorities.
Only a few studies have so far tackled the issue of
aggressive content as a form of individual/group empow-
erment or discussion fuel, while linguistic literature on
offensive speech points to its positive functions for the
speaker, such as release from tension or marking group
belonging. Burns (2008, p. 61) has stated that “this type
of linguistic behavior reflects and supports both the
successful functioning of societies and individuals.” This
might be especially true for restrictive political and legal
environments where various types of public offense are
prohibited by law and the political environment does not
givemuch space for voicing discontent. In these contexts,
dark participation could be a way to voice political dis-
sent and rebel against the hegemonic discourses of the
public sphere.
Our article aims at exploring the roles of aggressive
language in political discussions in a so-far heavily under-
researched context of countries with no sustainable
democratic tradition. For such a study, today’s Russia
represents a nearly perfect case. First, Russian society
and Russian public communication of the 2010s have
been fundamentally fragmented and increasingly polar-
ized (Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2015). Scholars describe a
post-perestroika values-based division of the nation into
a dominant traditionalist majority and an outlier minor-
ity of a mostly liberal-oppositional stance (Berezuev &
Zvonareva, 2019), with a high level of mutual hostility.
This allows for the exploration of the phenomenon of
politically motivated hate speech. Second, the recent
tightening of the political regime has, inter alia, brought
along new bans on extremist speech, public swearing,
and offending civil servants, thus giving offensive lan-
guage the new connotation of an act of political disobe-
dience. Third, in addition to hate lexicons, Russian has a
highly developed obscene sublanguage (mat), the func-
tions of which go far beyond just expression of aggres-
sion, and which is even considered an “exceptionally
rich” “linguistic system in its own right” and “a special
genre of folk-art” (Dreizin & Priestly, 1982, p. 233–234).
Fourth, the Russian-speaking segment of Internet, or
Runet, grew intensely and remained relatively unregu-
lated for quite a long time before the mid-2010s (Vendil
Pallin, 2017). By 2020, Internet penetration in Russia has
reached 79% and was expected to exceed 100 million cit-
izens by the end of 2020 (data by Krivoshapko, 2020),
with 70.5% of people using mobile Internet (Elagina,
2020). On the one hand, since the mid-2000s, habits of
discussions free from any bans have formed in Runet
(Bodrunova, in press). To this day, Runet talk remains
largely unbound by legal limitations, and the afore-
mentioned restrictions introduced in the 2010s started
to have their impact only very recently. For over two
decades, Runet has served as a constellation of are-
nas in the online public sphere ‘parallel’ to the offline
media landscape dominated by pro-state and loyal actors
(Kiriya, 2014), including arenas with alternative agen-
das (Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2015) and large publics
critical to leadership (Toepfl, 2020). On the other hand,
Runet is known for its platform-wide echo chambering
where, for example, Facebook is recognized as a liberal-
oppositional filter bubble (Bodrunova & Litvinenko,
2015), while, in some Twitter discussions, nationalist dis-
courses are dominant (Bodrunova, Blekanov, Smoliarova,
& Litvinenko, 2019). Scholars also documented radical-
ization of Russian-language online speech quite early
(Salimovsky & Ermakova, 2011).
Most studies of aggressive verbal behavior on Runet
have focused on how to conceptualize, detect, and filter
it out from ongoing or past online discussions (Koltsova,
2019). However, politicization of public swearing com-
bined with wide de-tabooing of mat by cultural com-
munities, the rural populace, and younger generations
calls for reassessment of the possible roles of aggressive
speech in political discussions. In particular, we ask what
roles different types of aggressive language play in Runet
political discussions.
For our enquiry, we use the case of Moscow protests
against non-admission of oppositional and independent
candidates to the elections of theMoscow city parliament
of July to September 2019. We have analyzed 77,847
comments under the most viewed YouTube videos on
this topic. We have assessed the roles of various types
of aggressive content in the dynamics of the discussion
by quantitative and qualitative instruments, including
Granger tests and interpretation of discussion histograms.
The remainder of the article is structured as fol-
lows. In Section 2, we reconstruct the relevant theo-
ries and contextual knowledge on YouTube discussions
in Russia. In Section 3, we pose the research questions
and hypotheses. In Section 4, we describe data collec-
tion, the sample, and research steps. Section 5 provides
the results and discussion, including the discovered roles
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of aggressive content. In the final section, we place the
results in the wider context of the dark participation and
communicative aggression studies.
2. Aggressive Speech in Runet Discussions: Theory
and Context
2.1. Communicative Aggression in Networked
Discussions: Only a Threat?
Scholars, lawyers, and public institutions have pro-
duced a myriad of definitions for verbal aggression,
hate speech, and other illegitimate ways of expression
(Brown, 2017a, 2017b). Many legal definitions, though,
are narrowed down by listing particular social groups
vulnerable to verbal hatred or aggressive beliefs, like
in case of anti-Semitism (see, for example, Council of
Europe, 1997, p. 107). As mentioned above, they do
not include groups defined by political views. However,
the rise of authoritarianism and polarization in many
countries demands an extension of the understanding of
aggressive speech online.
In our study, we use a wide definition of aggres-
sive speech by Cohen-Almagor (2011, p. 1): It is “bias-
motivated, hostile, malicious speech aimed at a person
or a group of people because of some of their actual
or perceived innate characteristics,” whichmight include
political groups. Here, we use the terms ‘[acts of] ver-
bal aggression’ and ‘aggressive speech’ interchangeably,
althoughwewell realize that aggressive speech is amani-
festation of aggression. In order to tailor this definition to
the focus of our research, we use two other approaches
that frame our understanding of aggressive speech.
First, for a formal definition of types of aggressive
communication, we use the concept of ‘communica-
tive aggression,’ as elaborated by Sidorov (2018). This
umbrella concept allows for systematizing various forms
of aggression in mediated communication. Following
Sidorov’s logic, we argue that distinguishable pragmatic
types of communicative aggression, such as cyberbul-
lying, virtual racism, political hate speech, or swearing,
link a certain speaker’s goal to a certain lexicon. Below,
we operationalize the types of communicative aggres-
sion relevant for conflictual political discussions. Second,
Parekh (2012), as cited and commented upon in Howard
(2017), provides criteria for differentiating communica-
tive aggression from political opinion, often also sharp
and provocative. Parekh (2012, p. 41) has noted that
hate speech “stigmatizes the target group by implicitly or
explicitly ascribing to it qualitieswidely regarded as unde-
sirable” and objectifies this group as a legitimate object
of hostility. This approach allows us to select, within
types of aggression, the lexical conglomerates linked to
undesirable objects, events, or features. This approach
also allows for distinction between verbal aggression
and expressions of anger and other negative emotions.
Undoubtedly, acts of verbal aggression are often used to
express anger and hatred, but not always: For instance,
an obscene lexicon that substitutes normal speech in
affective circumstances could express nearly any emo-
tion, from disappointment to puzzlement to even joy.
Our focus, thus, is not on emotions but on the speech
used for humiliation and offence.
The effects of hate speech on political discussions
have, so far, been almost exclusively assessed negatively
(Van Aken, Risch, Krestel, & Löser, 2018). However, in
certain contexts, aggressive content might help minori-
ties voice political dissent not heard otherwise. Before
the era of social networks, Delgado and Stefancic (1995)
claimed that, among students, expressions of hatredmay
spur substantial on-campus debates on social discrimina-
tion. Davidson, Warmsley, Macy, andWeber (2017) have
pointed to the possible use of potentially offensive lan-
guage in a positive sense in groups that face discrimina-
tion, such as the LGBTQ community.
With the rise of social networking platforms, the
issue of communicative aggression within them has
become sharp to an extent unprecedentedoffline,where
speech is not usually anonymized and detached from the
speaker. The freedom of ‘dark participation’ has become
part of a wider growth of dissonant public spheres
(Pfetsch, 2018) where users neither seek consensus nor
limit themselves by norms of public speech. The struc-
ture of such discussions has already been conceptualized
as affective (Papacharissi, 2015; that is, hardly rational
or reflexive, mostly highly emotional and quick to react)
and ad hoc (Bruns & Burgess, 2011), which may lead to
quick dissipation after the trigger event is over and does
not allow the commenting evolve into a meaningful dis-
cussion. However, it is exactly this state of the online dis-
course that calls for rethinking of the roles of aggressive
content within it. As stated above, it may allow users to
shape a wide variety of thoughts and feelings expressed
in rational discussions in another manner.
Aggressive content might also, presumably, influ-
ence discussion dynamics. Thus, Platonov and Svetlov
(2020) have found that negative posts on the social net-
work VK.comprovoke a larger number of comments than
neutral and positive ones. Our earlier works have shown
that anger and aggression in tweets might be related
to discussion intensity and pivotal turns in its topicality
(Bodrunova et al., 2020; Smoliarova, Bodrunova, Yakunin,
Blekanov, & Maksimov, 2019).
Given this, we might expect that aggressive speech
may play multiple (positive and negative) roles in online
discussions, for both its dynamics and content.
2.2. Aggressive Speech on Russian YouTube and the
Moscow Protests of 2019
2.2.1. Aggressive Language on Runet in the 2010s
Reassessment of aggression online might be especially
relevant for political cultures like Russia’s. As stated
above, relatively liberal regulation of online communica-
tion in the 2000s (Vendil Pallin, 2017) left room for both
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free political discussion and its radicalization. In Russia,
the rise of online radical, extremist, and nationalist
speech became a scholarly concern much earlier than in
most democratic countries (Etling et al., 2010; Kronhaus,
2012; Salimovsky & Ermakova, 2011). Widespread de-
tabooing of obscene language contributed to this pro-
cess. After the protests of 2011–2012 and the Ukrainian
crisis, a range of legal restrictions were introduced
(Litvinenko & Toepfl, 2019), and hundreds of legal cases
against online posting opened (Gabdulhakov, 2020).
Thus, in 2014, swear words were banned from use
in media and the arts (Federal Law, 2013; enacted in
2014). In 2016, the so-called ‘Yarovaya law package’ pro-
vided formal grounds for recognition of online speech
as extremist (Federal Law, 2016a, 2016b). In 2019, two
other laws expanded the ban of ‘disrespectful’ state-
ments about representatives of state power to include
online space (Federal Law, 2019a, 2019b). These laws
scaled up the range of instruments that could be used
by the elites to curb dissent online (Litvinenko & Toepfl,
2019). Despite this, the online discourse has largely
remained free of taboos.
In the 2010s, most English-language studies of
aggressive speech on Runetwere focused on inter-ethnic
hostility (Bodrunova, Koltsova, Koltcov, & Nikolenko,
2017; Koltsova, 2019) and online stigmatization prac-
tices (Dudina, Judina, & Platonov, 2019). Several criti-
cal studies have linked aggressive speech to activity of
pro-governmental trolls (Zvereva, 2020). In rare Russian-
language studies of verbal aggression online, authors
have mostly raised the issue of “degraded online talk”
(Salimovsky & Ermakova, 2011, p. 74), without empiri-
cally testing its possible functions in online discussions.
The linguo-pragmatic functions of obscene language
have been explored by linguists (up to 27 functions;
Havryliv, 2017; Zhel’vis, 1997). However, in none of these
studies has communicative aggression been linked to dis-
cussion dynamics or freedom of expression in a restric-
tive media environment.
2.2.2.Mat in Russian Culture and in Online Speech
In this context, the Russian swearing lexicon deserves
special attention: “Russia has an incredibly rich and ver-
satile swear sublanguage, called mat [emphasis added],
which is based on four key stems” (Pilkington, 2014;
see also Pluzer-Sarno, 2000), with several more stems
equally tabooed in public speech. Due to its inflective
nature, Russian provides these stems diverse opportuni-
ties to perform the functions of nouns, verbs, adjectives,
adverbs, and even interjections via the use of prefixes
and suffixes. As mat has undergone the strictest taboo-
ingwithin the Russian lexicon,we can expect that it bears
the highest level of aggression and, if used, changes
the discussion fabric. Similar to other languages, Russian
mat had experienced de-tabooing long before social net-
works were in place. In today’s oral and online speech,
swearing performs a variety of constructive pragmatic
functions, such as an increase of emotionality; release
from psychological tension, demonstration of relaxed-
ness and independence of the speaker; demonstration
of disregard to restrictions; marking in-group belonging,
etc. (Kosov, 2011, p. 37).
In today’s online speech, mat unites with politically
motivated hate speech, another under-explored type of
aggressive language. Their combination produces hybrid
pejorative neologisms directed at both political camps:
For example, towards the liberal-oppositional camp,
майданутый (maidanuty, or, in English, ‘f***ed in head
by the Ukrainian Maidan revolution’) and либераст
(liberast, that is, ‘liberal pederast’) are used, while
кремлядь (kremlyad, or ‘a prostitute from Kremlin’)
and пропагандон (propagandon, or ‘propagandistic con-
dom’) are used against the authorities and loyalist media.
These very neologisms are a sign of a politicization of
the obscene lexicon and mark the importance of both
obscene language and politically motivated hate speech
for online political discussions.
2.2.3. YouTube as an Alternative to TV: A Crossroads of
Polarized Opinions
We have chosen YouTube for our research because, in
the recent years, YouTube has moved to the front of
political communication in Russia. Since 2017, It has
been the third most popular Runet website, according to
Google Russia, with a monthly reach of 26% of Russians
(Polyakova, 2017). For Russians, YouTube has gradually
become an alternative to the state-dominated TV chan-
nels (Litvinenko, in press), with politics being one of the
popular topics.
A recent study of political discourse on Russian
YouTube during the 2018 presidential campaign has
shown that the ‘Popular’ section, featuring top Russian
YouTube videos, was dominated by oppositional actors
(Litvinenko, in press). The leading oppositional chan-
nels, like Navalny’s Alexey Navalny (with 3,94 million
subscribers) and Navalny LIVE (1,89 million subscribers);
pro-liberal independent media/journalist channels, like
VDud’ by Yury Dud’ (7,8 million), Alexey Pivovarov’s
Redaktsia (1,4 million), and TV Rain (1,37 million);
human-interest news vloggers like Roman Usachev (2,36
million); and critical political vloggers like Anatoly Shariy
(2,38 million) and kamikazedead (an estimated 1,5 mil-
lion of subscribers, as the actual figures are hidden) are
comparable in viewership to themain state-affiliated fed-
eral channels, like NTV (9,56 million), Pervy kanal (4,95
million), and Rossiya 1 (3,62 million) and outperform
many channels of national entertainment TV. Navalny’s
anti-corruption investigation published on YouTube in
2017 ‘Don’t call him Dimon’ (Navalny, 2017) gathered
more than 37,5 million views (as of January 2021) and
triggered nationwide street protests (Gorbachev, 2017).
Another advantage of YouTube is that, unlike
Facebook or VK.com, this platform has not yet been the
major focus of legal action against political activists. Also,
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Russian YouTube culture has been influenced by highly
popular rap battles where obscene and offensive speech
are core. As a result, Russian YouTube of the late 2010s
has grown into a freely speaking opinion crossroads with
a predomination of oppositional agenda and audience;
this constituted a suitable case for our research.
For our analysis, we have taken the case of the
Moscow protests of summer 2019, a vivid example
of polarization of Russian public communication. Non-
admission of oppositional and independent candidates
on ballots for the Moscow city parliament elections trig-
gered peaceful demonstrations in July 2019. They were
suppressed by police, which led to an escalation of the
conflict throughout August and September 2019. During
those months, videos featuring the riots were widely cir-
culated on YouTube and attracted a large number of com-
ments, politically split and manifestly aggressive.
3. Research Questions
In this article, we ask whether various types of commu-
nicative aggression play active roles in both the dynam-
ics and content of online political discussions. Here, in
general, our approach is of an exploratory nature; we ori-
ent to the multiple roles of obscene language but explore
whether other types of aggressive content may play simi-
lar roles.We follow the argument by Thelwall (2018), who
has argued for theuseof amixed-methodandexploration-
oriented approach for studies of YouTube comments.
In the following research question, we ask whether
various types of communicative aggression can spur dis-
cussions, what are the patterns of their appearance in
the course of discussions, and whether users tend to rad-
icalize individually and in discussion micro-clusters:
RQ1: Does communicative aggression affect discus-
sion dynamics?
Moreover, in the next research question, we askwhether
communicative aggression may be linked to democratic
functions of the public sphere, including fostering both
cross-groupdialogue and counter-publicity.Wealso have
in mind the above-mentioned functions of aggressive
speech, where one can distinguish between psycholog-
ical functions (like individual release of tension), social-
psychological functions (like marking belonging), and
political functions (like struggle for privilege or power):
RQ2: What roles do various types of communicative
aggression play in political discussions online?
4. Method and Sampling
4.1. Data Collection
For our analysis, we have chosen the comments under
the most popular YouTube videos about the Moscow
protests of 2019. To form a sample, we tried three strate-
gies: assessing the ‘Popular’ section, examining the pop-
ular political accounts, and searching by protest-related
keywords. As a result, we decided to focus not on
accounts but on individual videos, and have selected the
15 most popular videos in the search results for ‘Moscow
protests’ that reached over 100,000 views uploaded to
YouTube between July 27 (the start of the active phase of
the street protests) and September 8 (the election day).
Of those, two videos did not allow for comment upload:
Radio Liberty disabled comments, and comments for the
video by the oppositional news outlet Current Timewere
automatically blocked for download. Thus, we crawled
and downloaded the comments for 13 videos from ten
accounts, which resulted in 77,847 comments altogether,
the number of comments per video ranging from 538 to
more than42,400. This collection allowedus to gather the
most intense discussion fragments on the protests within
Russian social media and trace its dynamics over time.
4.2. Methods of Data Processing and Research Steps
4.2.1. (Re)Conceptualizing Aggressive Speech for
Conflictual Political Discussions
Following what was stated above, we first needed to con-
ceptualize the types of aggression and the lexical con-
glomerates within them for automated analysis. A pre-
liminary reading of over 3,000 posts in the dataset led
us to rejecting the usual types of aggression, includ-
ing cyberbullying, inter-ethnic hostility, and homopho-
bia, as they were not the focus of the discussion.
We have formulated four types of communicative aggres-
sion, all politically relevant and tabooed/prohibited
by law: 1) Humiliation, including politically motivated
hate speech and discriminative expressions—this type is
partly directed at authorities and police and, thus, might
fall under the law on offence of civil servants; 2) radical
political claims (similar to ‘Carthage must be destroyed’),
including calls for aggressive action against individuals
or groups—this is prohibited, as it may be considered
extremism or a call to overthrow the existing political sys-
tem; and 3) obscene language (mat and equally tabooed
lexemes), which is tabooed and prohibited by the law
against public swearing.
Then, we have further narrowed down our research
via assessing the possibilities for automated analysis.
We have found that, in over the 3,000 posts of the pre-
liminary study, the number of radical calls for action
amounted to only several dozen andwere very diverse in
lexical and grammatical terms; this was not enough even
for deep learning andwas only suitable for manual analy-
sis. Thus, politically motivated hate speech and obscene
language became our major focus.
4.2.2. Selection of the Lexicon for Automated Analysis
Out of the preliminary analysis, the following lexical
clusters were manually detected in obscene speech:
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mat with case endings; mat with flexions (nouns, pro-
nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, etc.); lexemes tabooed
equally to mat, with flexions; mat altered not to break
the law (using *, @, ‘.,’ ‘$,’ etc.); euphemisms of mat;
and a lexicon of the lower body and defecation, which
is less tabooed.
The following lexical clustersweremanually detected
in politically motivated hate speech inside anti-state
discourse, pointing to: the police, in comparisons to
garbage, lapdogs of the regime, cosmonauts (due to the
uniforms), and the KGB; institutions, mostly the ‘United
Russia’ party and the State Duma; the regime, by compar-
ing its rule to that of theNazis, to the Tsarist gendarmerie,
and to organized crime (e.g., mafia); the state-affiliated
media as ‘purchasable’ or bot-like; and individual politi-
cians and their visual appearance.
The following lexical clusters were manually
detected in politically motivated hate speech inside anti-
opposition discourse: pejoratives of ‘liberal’ and ‘democ-
racy’ made via flexions and stem combinations; ‘fifth
column,’ the insider betrayers; diminutives and pejora-
tives formed out of the names of oppositional leaders
Alexey Navalny and Luybov Sobol; linking the opposi-
tion to the USA, its grant funding, and philanthropists
like George Soros; the Ukrainian pro-European Maidan
revolution of 2013; LGBTQ and gayropa (‘gay-favoring
Europe’); and slacktivism.
We also detected offensive lexicon addressed to both
political camps: markers of stupidity and ugliness, and
prison slang; and to other groups: ethnic pejoratives.
Pre-tests on detection of aggression showed that the
two latter groups were minor and did not play any signif-
icant role in the fabric of the discussion, while the three
former groups mattered. Thus, the last two groups were
excluded from further analysis.
The overall number of stems submitted to the stem
detector amounted to 286. Also, 216 of them potentially
contained flexions and case endings; thus, for the three
types of aggressive speech, the overall expected number
of lexical units was over 500.
4.2.3. Addressing the RQs
To assess the role of aggression in discussion dynam-
ics, we created the scripts to automatically detect the
selected lexicons in the dataset and marked the com-
ments as neutral, obscene, anti-state, or anti-opposition.
The cases where the lexicon originally directed against
the state or the opposition was used to form the oppo-
site meaning (e.g., sarcastic) were fewer than 2% for all
the videos; the commentswhere both anti-state and anti-
opposition lexicons were found were even fewer, which
shows that these lexicons are, indeed, markers of com-
menters’ distinct political positioning.
Then, we conducted Granger tests juxtaposing the
overall number of posts and the number of neutral posts
with the number of the following types of posts: aggres-
sive, obscene, politically aggressive, anti-state, and anti-
opposition, where ‘politically aggressive’ was anti-state
and anti-opposition combined. As the discussion was
intense for around four days in all the cases, three-day
and four-day periodswere selected for testing.We tested
one-hour, two-hour, and six-hour increments; in addition,
15-minute and 30-minute incrementswere tested for the
most commented-on videos. Altogether, 34 tests were
performed. For the Granger tests, the comments that
contained both anti-state and anti-opposition lexicons
were excluded from analysis.
To assess individual vs. micro-group patterns of pres-
ence of aggressive speech, we decided to go for linear
and interval histograms. While, for the Granger tests,
the posts were singled out independently, for the his-
tograms, we first singled out the posts with obscene
language, then those with anti-state claims, and then
those with anti-opposition claims; if the marking over-
lapped, the post was marked preferentially red, then yel-
low, then green. The number of overlapping posts, again,
never grew over 3% of all aggressive posts. Hourly steps
were introduced to demonstrate the discussion dynam-
ics. Axis x ranged theusers by timeof their first post; axis y
ranged the discussion in time. This allowed for assessing
individual and micro-group user speech in time.
RQ2 was addressed in a grounded-theory manner.
We did not pre-suppose any roles in advance, but were
orienting to the lists of possible functions of obscene




The videos that happened to be in our collection
belonged to three types: foreign media in Russian (BBC
News, Euronews, DW, and a Ukrainian correspondent
in Moscow), Russian oppositional public political fig-
ures also active in media/online (Alexey Navalny, Maxim
Shevchenko), and activist channels focused mainly on
independent news production (My Protest, Mordor
Channel, and Superpower News). As stated above, we
have looked at whether aggressive posts fueled the sub-
sequent discussion—or whether aggression just grew
when the discussion itself grew, for which we used
Granger tests. The results are presented in Figures 1
and 2 (two-hour increment). They show that, in 12
cases out of 13, the dynamics of the discussion was
spurred by aggressive speech, and in 8 cases at least
to the medium level. In at least five cases out of 13,
this was not reciprocated—that is, if aggression grew or
fell, the number of subsequent posts grew or fell accord-
ingly. The videos showed different patterns of interac-
tion between aggression and the overall discussion, but,
in any case, we can make several conclusions.
Thus, both obscene and political aggression can play
the role of discussion fuel; but, when one does it, the
other is rarely involved. How aggression works seems
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Figure 1. The results of the Granger test (two-hour increment). Notes: ‘Direct effect’ appears when the number of aggres-
sive posts grows due to the overall growth of a discussion; ‘reverse effect’ appears when a discussion grows due to
growth of the number of aggressive posts. 1) Blue: direct effect; orange: reverse effect; grey: data too scarce for the test.
2) Weak: F < 10, 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05; medium: p = 0.001 ≤ p ≤ 0.01; strong: F > 10, 0.0001 ≤ p < 0.001; very strong: F > 10,
1e-12 < p < 0.0001.
to depend on two dimensions: author type and genre.
Thus, aggression clearly fuels discussion under commen-
taries by political activists (even if the size of the dis-
cussion under Navalny’s video makes the trend recipro-
cal), while under commentaries by foreign news media
both effects appear in weak tomedium state, and, under
news and the interview, the effects are clearly much less
sound. For political celebrities, discussion fuels aggres-
sion (again, reciprocated under Navalvy’s video)—that
is, the volume of the discussion matters. The smaller-
sample cases show that obscene language might be
provocative and bring on politically harsh speech, while,
in bigger discussions, this effect is overcome. Due to
scarcity, anti-liberal talk did not have an impact upon the
discussions, but, overall, aggression played a significant
role in how half of the discussions developed.
However, somewhat surprisingly, it is doubtful that
one can call the comment conglomerates ‘discussions.’
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Figure 2. The mixed effects of communicative aggression on the dynamics of the overall number of posts and the number of neutral posts (two-hour increment), accompanied by video
metadata. Note: Blue—direct effect; green—reciprocal (both direct and reverse) effect; orange—reverse effect; grey—data too scarce for the test.
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In the aforementioned histograms (Figures 3 and 4), we
reproduced the commenting patterns by showing each
user’s posts in time, to see if they commented multi-
ple times, and the intensity of the discussion by hourly
intervals. The histograms clearly point to the affective
and ad hoc nature of commenting, as, for all the dis-
cussions except Navalny’s (Figure 3), repeated comment-
ing is very rare (Figure 4). And, despite that, the fabric
of the discussions is imbued with aggression, regardless
of legal prohibitions; moreover, it rarely looks like an
exchange of offensive comments, but rather like expres-
sive ‘shouts to the air’ that condemn one of the political
sides. We have also spotted micro-outbursts of aggres-
sion in smaller cases (Figure 4, circled); in big discus-
sions, though, when individual users post multiple times
(Figure 3, circled), they are likely to be aggressive, but
when several users post simultaneously in a dynamic
micro-cluster (Figure 3, squared), they, against expecta-
tions, abandon aggressive discourse. Thus, users mostly
come to express to the author their aggressive support
and solidarity in condemnation, and they rarely address
their anger to fellow commenters; if engaged in further
talking, they talk non-aggressively.
5.2. RQ2
Beyond immediate expression of support and solidar-
ity, aggressive speech performs an array of functions
that tie together the affective nature of the discus-
sions and the outer context. The most evident func-
tion is, by nature, sociological, as use of politicized
obscene speech and pejoratives fosters political iden-
tities of the polarized camps sharply demarcating ‘us’
from ‘them’ (Van Dijk, 1993). This is already evident from
the anti-state and anti-opposition lexical conglomerates
described above, where an obscene lexicon intertwines
with political pejoratives to the extent of neologisms.
Additionally, a ‘normal’ group is put in open opposition
to a group marked as undesirable, in agreement with
Parekh (2012):
Cop mutts, they go against the people, shameful!!!
Every normal person disrespects rogues, thieves, and
organized criminal groups!
Police are the best. One must nip the white-stripe
coup d’état in the bud. Mercenary liberast beasts
should be jailed!
Destructive to potential consensus between political
antagonists, anti-state hate speech becomes a construc-
tive means of counter-public consolidation. Interestingly,
predominance of statements that favor oppositional dis-
course makes pro-state commenters, whose opinions

















Figure 3. Interval histogram of the discussion, video 1: Individual aggressive vs. interactive neutral speech.
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Figure 4. Linear histogram, video 13: Micro-clusters of aggression.
[To Lyubov Sobol whose hunger strike is depicted in
the video] You think you put on glasses and got smart?
Stupid. Realize one thing: Russia will not lie under
your curators, even if you crap your pants together
with the [US] State Dept.! As for your rallies…in the
same Europe people like you are killed with fly swat-
ters….Who do you serve, evil forces?
I amnot going to prove anything. If you’re idiot enough
to be buying this whole show with Sobol’s hunger
strike, swollen Navalny, etc., it’s up to you, but don’t
change flags after your idols leave for other countries.
In contrast, for the pro-opposition speakers, the very use
of prohibited language may delineate a restriction-free
realm. In political terms, aggressive speech challenges
the hegemonic discourse (otherwise unchallengeable)
and seeks to protect a way of thinking. And this, to an
extent, is true for both political camps.
Via the use of particular metaphors in harsh lexicon,
aggressive critique puts the current political regime in
a row of national traumas from the 20th century, espe-
cially with World War II and the uncontrolled capital-
ism of the ‘frantic 1990s,’ united by the underlying refer-
ence to a dysfunctionality of the political scene captured
by force:
Occupation, Siege, Nazism.
A 100%OCG [organized criminal group] runs the show.
There are tops, and there are ‘thugs.’ Just the classic
nineties but on a national scale!
Anothermetaphorical line points to the issue of freedom
vs. excessive control:
In a concentration camp, there are no rights.
Democracy and freedom are the least of it. Russia has
been captured by Nazis!!!
Bandits in uniform. They do not protect the citizens;
they enslave them.
Anti-liberal speech, in its turn, radically addresses fears
of yet another system revolt: post-Cold War cleav-
ages in values, deep suspicion towards American and
European intentions, and post-imperial resentment.
Here, post-Maidan Ukraine is often posed as an example
of a country destroyed by a ‘color revolution,’ and, like-
wise, the 1990s are a symbol of poverty and instability:
Go on rallying! [The USA] State Dept. will be grate-
ful…1991 and 1993 forgotten? Moscow b****es!
Trying to sell Russia again? That time [it was] for jeans
and salami, and now what for?
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For a secondMaidan! For the return to the 1990s! For
hunger and destitution! Hurraaaaaaaa!!!!
While obscene language marks the emotion intensity, it
is exactly the aggressive political talk that is responsible
for contextualization—and, thus, for re-appropriation of
the right of political interpretation for both camps. Thus,
two types of aggression (obscene and political) support
each other in user posts. Moreover, in the absence of
sound public debate and chances for peaceful dissent,
aggressive ‘speaking out what is suppressed’ serves as
a way to vent anger. This, inter alia, can be beneficial
for the regime, as users who vent their anger online may
refrain from offline protest, as described by Toepfl (2020)
in his conceptualization of risks and benefits of critical
publics for autocracies.
Last but not least, we observed a high level of cre-
ativity in political use of tabooed language, from stem
fusion to ‘bleeping’ of prohibitedwords. Anopposition to
the sterile and deliberate official language, it marks the
grassroots, ingenuous, and censorship-free character of
political discussions online.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, we have challenged the view of commu-
nicative aggression online as a necessarily negativemeans
of disempowerment and de-legitimation.We have shown
that under-studied types of communicative aggression,
such as obscene language and politically motivated hate
speech, may not only escalate conflict in public debate
but, by contrast, also play constructive democratic roles
for individuals, groups, and discursive processes in a
restrictive political atmosphere. This includes expression
of support and solidarity, counter-public consolidation, re-
appropriation of rights to interpret historical context, and
manifestation of creativity and wit that opposes restric-
tions and official discourses. Some of these functions are,
of course, double-edged swords: Thus, consolidation of a
counter-public leads to widening gaps between it and the
wider public, and interpretation of context available for
both pro- and counter-establishment groups may poten-
tially lead to abuse of historical memory. However, such
elements of public deliberation are in any case more char-
acteristic of democratic contexts than of autocratic ones.
This is why we claim that one can speak of ‘construc-
tive aggression’ and differentiate it from destructive hate
speech and an obscene lexicon if it plays constructive
roles in public discussions; similarly, misinformation may
be shared online with constructive motivations (Metzger,
Flanagin, Mena, Jiang, & Wilson, 2021).
Our results have supported the claim that commu-
nicative aggression not only thrives within YouTube reac-
tions to oppositional videos but also fuels user talk.
We have spotted micro-outbursts of both aggression
(by newcomers) and neutral talk (by discussants), while,
in general, aggression was spread throughout the affec-
tive conglomerates of posts.
By analyzing the roles of aggressive content, we have
seen that it may play a significant role in the forma-
tion of ad hoc counter-publics around a politically polar-
izing issue in online discussions, even when the pat-
terns of user interaction reveal a disrupted public. It is
politically motivated hate speech that, at least partly,
forms the fabric of collective expression in comments.
We have explored how the personal-level functions of
aggressive speech, including mat, manifest themselves
on the group level and gain political relevance. In the
Russian case, communicative aggression is linked to
giving voice to political opposition, which is overwise
excluded from the mainstream discourse, and may fos-
ter counter-publics and offline action, as was the case
during the Russian protests of 2011–2012 (Bodrunova
& Litvinenko, 2015). This function of aggressive speech
is in line with the strand of research on agonistic pub-
lic spheres that emphasizes the importance of political
conflict and political voices ‘from the margins’ for pub-
lic deliberation (Dahlberg, 2007, p. 128). If, as in Russia,
offensive language is officially banned in the media,
using this kind of language per se might become a way
to challenge the hegemonic official discourses.
The limitations of our research come from its
exploratory nature, as well as from the limited number
of videos around which the core discussion evolved. But
even more, they stem from the nature of the discovered
publics, as the lack of interaction between commenters
prevents the use of, for example, social network analyt-
ics. Our findings support the idea of affective and disso-
nant publics, but partly re-interpret dissonance and ‘dark
participation’ as democratically functional. They also
point out to cumulative effects in online communication.
Our research shows that fighting aggressive speech
on global social media platforms can, inter alia, give auto-
crats a tool to curb political dissent online. It can also
mean depriving marginalized groups of the opportunity
to vent their anger, which may lead, instead of to the
expected harmonization of political communication, to
an escalation of violence, both online and offline. One
may ask how true this might be for democratic contexts;
this would be intriguing to explore in future research.
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